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Since the inception of the Air Force, our Nation has asked us to create aerospace forces that 
no adversary could ―out gun‖ under any circumstances. For over six decades we have ans-
wered that call. Now the Nation demands that we also create a set of capabilities that no 
adversary can ―out smart‖ in the future. This strategy outlines our response in the realm of 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).  
This is a new document that specifies why and how our Air Force will provide the capacity 
and capability for full spectrum ISR. It provides the foundation for enabling our air compo-
nents to joint forces to ―out smart‖ any adversary. This is our overarching plan for integrat-
ing people, equipment, processes, and investments to achieve Global Vigilance, Global 
Reach, and Global Power through cross domain integration of air, space and cyberspace ISR 
systems.  
This strategy sets the conditions to achieve persistent surveillance and improves the inte-
gration of information to facilitate decision superiority. It advances Air Force ISR simultane-
ously as an enabler of tactical forces, as the provider of theater-wide operational level pers-
pectives for joint commanders, and as a strategic lever for national decision makers. It 
combines our historical advantage of an elevated perspective with the means to achieve in-
sight and foresight to yield a decisive advantage in National Security operations.  
This strategy charts how USAF ISR can produce desired security effects today and in the fu-
ture. Pulling the trigger is but one way to defeat our adversaries—USAF ISR, while enabling 
trigger pullers—also provides a multitude of additional ways to achieve National Security ob-
jectives.  
The details of this strategy and their implications may be debated, but one thing is clear: we 
must move away from the notion of discrete ISR operations in separate domains and focus 
on integration of ISR capabilities to achieve Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power.  
Our Nation demands that we combine our perspective and energy with the leading edge 
technologies of the information age to produce decisive effects wherever and whenever re-
quired. This strategy for Air Force intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aims to an-
swer our Nation‘s call. 
 
David A. Deptula, Lieutenant General 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
Headquarters, United States Air Force 
Washington, D.C. 
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Our strategy for the future intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) enterprise of 
the United States Air Force has a single, ambitious goal. We intend to achieve Global Vigil-
ance, Global Reach, and Global Power through cross-domain integration of ISR—from, in, 
and through air, space and cyberspace. Achieving this goal is critical to the future success of 
American joint military operations and the achievement of long-range national objectives, 
but it is by no means assured or solely an Air Force mission. These national objectives not 
only include all phases of military operations, but diplomatic, information, and economic ob-
jectives as well. This goal requires large, long-term and integrated investments in equip-
ment and people. Once achieved, however, the fusion of cross-domain knowledge and 
cross-domain exploitation offers our Nation the means to dominate the conflicts of our time. 
For the last quarter-century, our global security environment has been defined by turmoil. 
The collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the breakup of Yugoslavia, 
Desert Storm, Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch, 9/11, Afghanistan, and the 
terrorist actions in Iraq are but some examples.  
This instability will almost certainly persist. We live in exponential times. As much as the 
world has changed, economically, socially and politically in the past two decades, it will 
change that much – possibly more – in the next two decades. Accelerating technologies 
continue to redefine how our world generates wealth and power. They create entirely new 
opportunities and social systems while disrupting existing institutions, rules, authorities and 
assumptions. Because old and emerging powers across our globalized world adapt at differ-
ent speeds, they repeatedly run into and past each other. The inevitable result is friction on 
a global scale.  
It is important to note that the underlying force behind this constant friction, and the reason 
we believe it will persist, is a continuing phenomena of historic scope – the disruptive tech-
nologies of the information age. They drive us to expect cycle after cycle of revolutionary 
change throughout our planning period. 
Global spending on information and communications is now $3½ trillion a year, 
and climbing. It is on course to reach $4 trillion a year by 2010. Spending at this level ge-
nerates tighter and tighter cycles of discovery and innovation.  
For example, despite repeated predictions of its demise, Moore‘s Law endures. As it has for 
40 years, computer processing continues to double every 18-24 months. Bandwidth is also 
doubling at the same logarithmic pace. If these rates continue as expected for another 15-
20 years (our planning horizon), processing capacity and bandwidth will each be 1000 times 
greater than today. Systems we use now will seem quaint by comparison. 
What knowledge will these machines and networks create? Clear-cut projections are impos-
sible; forecasts consistently underestimate the pace and scope of the information age. How-
ever, we are certain that as discovery and innovation feed each other, they will spawn the 
next generation of machines and networks, creating the next generation of knowledge, 
which will produce even more advanced machines and networks, producing more knowl-
edge, and so on.  
Conflicts of the future will exploit these continuing cycles. The most dangerous ad-
versaries will combine the latest information technologies with innovative tactics to produce 
unique capabilities. Whether nation states or insurgents, they will organize into small, net-
worked cells of committed people. They will also incorporate legacy weapons and concepts, 
which still pose powerful challenges. This combination of emerging technologies, multiple 
types of enemies, new and legacy weapons, and innovative operational concepts – will 
merge to create a unique era in warfare.  
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Yet since the end of the Cold War, there has been one constant—the need for persistent ISR 
to find and understand the enemy. We cannot continue to conduct ―business as usual‖ in 
the realm of ISR. We must change methods and connectivity to achieve persistence. While 
no single technology or enemy defines this age, it is the fusion of technology and ideas that 
forms the emerging character of modern war. Taken as a whole, they produce new means, 
methods and reasons for conflict. 
Our challenge is to lead turn each cycle in this era of war. USAF ISR cannot wait until 
new technologies are in place before transforming our organizations, skills, and equipment. 
Hesitation is too risky a strategy. In today‘s competitive environment, where start-up com-
panies accelerate into hundred billion dollar corporations in less than a decade, strategic 
threats to national security emerge just as 
quickly. To get out ahead of future oppor-
tunities and threats, USAF ISR must post-
ure itself to exploit each generation of 
knowledge-driven capabilities as soon as 
they arrive. In the midst of continuous 
change, we need people, organizations and 
equipment that anticipate new technologies – that constantly build new skills and new con-
cepts of operations – to realize the potential of new knowledge-driven capabilities. In es-
sence, USAF ISR must prepare itself for where technologies will be, not just for where they 
presently are.  
The first hard break in our lead turn pursues ―persistent surveillance.‖ Next generation sen-
sors and networks will let us monitor targets, on demand, near-continuously, to produce tai-
lored effects. This potential capability is the product of trillions of dollars of investment and 
orders of magnitude advances in processing, storage and bandwidth. Persistent surveillance 
will, as stated in the 2006 QDR, ―…establish an ‗unblinking eye‘ over the battle-space…‖, in-
cluding ―…operations against any target, day or night, in any weather, and in denied or con-
tested areas.‖ 
But ―persistent surveillance‖ is only an interim objective. We want to maneuver toward 
―persistent ISR.‖ USAF ISR must build – in parallel with our joint partners – next generation 
systems for sensing, processing, analysis, 
decision, dissemination and attack. We must 
climb now to turn tomorrow‘s persistent 
surveillance into actionable intelligence – in 
modes our air, space and cyberspace 
forces—plus the rest of the joint team and 
national leadership—can exploit.  
Persistent ISR is, admittedly, a challenging 
goal. It requires new tools and methods for 
data analysis, multi-level security and 
access to denied areas. It demands a net-
centric architecture that connects sensors, 
processing, data storage, analysts and war-
fighting platforms into a whole greater than 
the sum of its parts. We believe emerging 
technologies place these demands within 
reach. More to the point for military profes-
                                                 
1 Testimony of Commander, US Special Operations Command to House Armed Services Committee, 31 Jan 2007 
2 Discussion with the Council on Foreign Relations, 7 September 2007 (Federal News Service). 
Persistent airborne ISR is a critical supporting ele-
ment to USSOCOM’s prosecution of the GWOT. ISR 
must not only be ever present, but must rapidly 
disseminate operational information to key ele-
ments on the battlefield.  
-- General Doug Brown, USA, 20071 
In the post-9/11 era, intelligence is more crucial 
to the security of the republic than ever before. 
Now, that's, I recognize, a pretty sweeping asser-
tion, so let me try to spell out what I mean with 
an historical analogy. I mentioned mutually as-
sured destruction in the Cold War. If that war ev-
er came, the Soviet Union's most deadly forces -- 
ICBMs, tank armies -- they were actually relative-
ly easy to find, but they were very hard to kill. 
Intelligence was important, don't get me wrong, 
but intelligence was overshadowed by the need 
for raw, shear fire power. Today the situation is 
reversed. We're now in an age in which our pri-
mary adversary is easy to kill; he's just very hard 
to find. So you can understand why so much em-
phasis in the last five years has been placed on 
intelligence.  
-- General Michael V. Hayden, USAF, 20072 
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sionals, because persistent ISR is achievable, our competitive security environment de-
mands we attain it.  
As Airmen, we are well positioned to achieve and exploit persistent ISR. Our Air Force com-
bines speed, range, flexibility, precision and lethality in all dimensions of warfare – land, sea, 
air, space and cyberspace – across the spectrum of time and operations. By combining per-
sistent ISR with our competencies we can produce effects ideally suited for the emerging 
security environment. The result of our global vigilance can produce the global power 
needed to deter conflicts and win wars.  
This merge requires considerable expertise. It requires ISR professionals who simultaneous-
ly understand the operational concepts, capabilities and vulnerabilities of USAF, joint, allied 
forces, and enemy forces. Our Airmen must combine the knowledge they create with the 
operational capabilities of the other elements of national power. We must be equally adept 
at working with surface units, bombers, fighters, cyberwarriors, national decision makers, 
joint forces, elements of the intelligence community, and our other partners.3 All depend on 
us. They need our perspective and fusion. Exceeding their expectations is our goal. 
We intend to produce thorough knowledge of 
every enemy that they will know – or immediate-
ly realize – that any conflict will be fought on our 
terms, to their detriment. Our enemies must un-
derstand that our comprehensive knowledge of 
them, combined with our kinetic and non-kinetic 
weapons, can turn their military, nation, or cell 
into a hollow force, with unreliable security, in-
sufficient logistics, uncertain command, corrupt 
knowledge, and exposed maneuver. Our ISR pro-
fessionals will exploit air, space, and cyberspace 
to learn how enemies operate (e.g., their net-
works, tactics, training and logistics), identify op-
tions to deter them and, if necessary, negate 
their means for making war.  
Dominating capabilities, however, will not evolve from the skills, institutions and platforms 
of the past. They demand a uniquely trained, equipped, integrated, and empowered enter-
prise. They require networked organizational structures and leading edge capabilities that 
synchronize new and legacy systems across joint and national teams. Guiding the future 
development of the personnel, doctrine, operational art, organization and equipment neces-
sary for this new strategic environment is the purpose of this ISR Strategy. 
 
                                                 
3 For example, without the exquisite knowledge provided by cross-agency sensors and analytical skills, the US 
would not have been able to determine the need for and then carry out a mission to shoot down a crippled experi-
mental satellite in February 2008, thus averting a potential hazard to populated areas while also demonstrating our 
ISR capabilities to the world. 
4 Address to the Air Force Association symposium, 21 February 2008. 
As we look forward, the strategic environment is going to be characterized by challenges. We have 
to understand that the world we will likely live in tomorrow will be equally complex, if not more chal-
lenging, than the world we live in today. With that as a baseline, looking out into the future, I be-
lieve we have an opportunity to redefine American air power to deal with those challenges across 
those three domains. 
-- General T. Michael Moseley, USAF4 
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TRAIN FOR THE FUTURE 
 
The United States Air Force is not, and has never been, a force that prefers defensive op-
erations. From the start of any fight, our doctrine is to attack. We are convinced that ―air 
and space power is best used as an offensive weapon.‖5 This spirit has guided us to victory 
after victory since our birth: Mitchell over St Mihiel, Doolittle over Tokyo, Eaker over Ger-
many, LeMay in the Cold War, Horner in Desert Storm. Prevailing over the enemy through 
offensive operations is core for understanding the United States Air Force of today, and en-
visioning the United States Air Force of the future. 
How we take the offensive is not a constant; it changes over time. In different eras, as 
technologies and situations dictate, Airmen adjust the means and methods of offensive op-
erations. Bombers led the force during World War II and the Cold War, fighters during the 
Vietnam and Korean Wars, and transports during the Berlin Airlift. Each stepped up to lead 
offensive operations at different times. Different generations of Airmen regularly swapped 
lead to match the character and technologies of the time. 
Our generation of Airmen faces another lead change. In a world where we can hit 
anything-anywhere-anytime, finding the enemy has moved to the forefront of USAF opera-
tions. We now live in the information age. It is redefining the domain, size and location of 
offensive operations. We now fight in air, space and – an entirely new medium – cyber-
space. Our enemies are not only the massed forces of the past, but also the demassified 
and hyper-empowered groups of the present. Modern technologies give even small military 
units and terrorist groups an array of kinetic and non-kinetic weapons capable of striking 
our Nation with strategic effect.  
Even as their weapons grow more powerful, the signatures of these threats are shrinking. 
Enemies can hide deep within huge cities that multiply in density and number every day. 
They can also disperse among complex terrain while still remaining in constant contact.  
These strategic conditions combine to require a basic shift in USAF operations. Our military 
imperative is no longer just to hit the enemy; today, we and the rest of the joint team, can 
kill whatever target we find. Our greatest challenge today is to identify and understand the 
enemy we need to affect, preferably before it has a chance to strike.  
To maintain the initiative, we cannot wait until enemies announce themselves. Before they 
strike, we must know: who are they; where are they; and, what they want. With this know-
ledge we can strip emerging enemies of their anonymity. Our Air Force components of the 
appropriate joint organizations can then attack or deter while enemies are still in their plan-
ning stages – before they can attack the United States with strategic effect.  
                                                 
5 AFDD 1, Basic Doctrine, p. 21. 
6 Ibid., p. 19. 
More recently, however, the nature of the threats and the way we choose to deter and fight those con-
flicts have changed. The United States is faced with adversaries who may seek to offset our technolo-
gical superiority through asymmetric means, threatening the use of chemical, biological, or radiologi-
cal weapons; information attacks; terrorism; urban warfare; or, anti-access strategies, either overseas 
or at home. Therefore, we must seize the initiative from the aggressor as soon as possible. Military 
capabilities that are vulnerable to preset time lines risk attack of those time lines. Delay in decisively 
and quickly halting an enemy may force a difficult and costly campaign to recover lost territory. Addi-
tionally, the asymmetric threats of lost coalition support, diminished credibility, and emerging incen-
tives for other adversaries to begin conflict elsewhere are real. Thus, a new way of looking at conflict 
is emerging.             -- Air Force Basic Doctrine6 
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No military has ever fielded the knowledge capabilities we intend to deploy. This vision will 
require unique approaches to achieve. 
It is telling that joint doctrine defines ―data‖ and ―information,‖ but not knowledge. Data 
and information, however, are objects to discover and manipulate. They are important to 
offensive operations, but not sufficient. To 
get ahead of our enemies, we must know 
their goals, understand their strategies, 
anticipate their maneuvers, and then force 
our enemies to change their behavior con-
sistent with our national security objec-
tives. This level of knowledge is central to the art of modern war.  
Knowledge of this quality is not available through simple observations or single reports. It is 
only created by well-developed professionals, exploiting multi-phenomena networks, over 
extended periods of time.  
Our doctrine, training, and development paradigm must recognize the imperative to create 
knowledge. The information age has moved ISR to the forefront of USAF component offen-
sive operations. Knowledge is now the ―fuel,‖ the fundamental prerequisite for success. We 
must instill in our Airmen that knowledge has priority among all USAF missions in the 21st 
Century.  
Building knowledge requires a team. Airmen will 
combine different levels of knowledge. Some will 
focus on immediately using knowledge we pro-
duce. Other Airmen will import knowledge into the 
intelligence network. Still others will export know-
ledge for the rest of the joint team to exploit, bun-
dle knowledge through fusion, or broker knowledge 
by delivering tailored assessments to specific con-
sumers. Each aspect of building knowledge is criti-
cal to overall success. Each member of the team is 
necessary to achieve air, space and cyberspace ef-
fects in the information age.  
It is the human element that creates knowledge. Machines help in extraordinary ways, 
but they only do what humans tell them to do. Regardless of the sophistication of our plat-
forms, sensors, computers and bandwidth, in the final analysis we depend on teams of hu-
mans to produce actionable intelligence. 
As we develop the USAF ISR enterprise of the future, our number one focus is on develop-
ing our 19,000 USAF ISR Airmen and civilians for a new era. In addition to all the basic 
principles we value in developing Airmen, we will add five principles to specifically guide the 
development of USAF ISR professionals: 
• Understand the enemy as a system. Modern enemies are more than divisions of ar-
mies, flights of aircraft, or cells of terrorists. They are complex ―organisms,‖ dependent 
on leadership, people, resources, infrastructure, and defenses. Lose one of these key es-
sentials and an enemy is crippled. Lose all of them and the enemy is eliminated. USAF 
ISR has the opportunity to affect these losses by combining information age tools with 
the perspective granted by air, space and cyberspace. This combination has the poten-
tial to allow our ISR professionals to understand our enemies to a degree not otherwise 
achievable; where they are, what they are, what they want to be, and what they fear. 
                                                 
7 Speech by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, at Nellis AFB NV, 18 June 2008, as reported by American Forces 
Press Service. 
Once a commander gets a taste of what we can do 
with the kinds of support that intelligence, surveil-
lance and reconnaissance provide, they can’t get 
enough of it. 
-- Admiral Michael Mullen, USN, 20087  
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Once we understand our enemies‘ key 
essentials as best we can—
understanding that complete knowledge 
is not achievable given current technol-
ogical means—we can select the most 
effective means of attack and accurate-
ly assess the success or failure of our 
actions. Taken as a whole, this ap-
proach is ideally suited to the spectrum 
of 21st Century conflict. 
• Understand the environment. Ours 
is an effects-based enterprise. The ef-
fects we impose can cascade far beyond 
a specific target. We must strive to un-
derstand and anticipate these effects in advance. To project possible effects on foreign 
cultures we must first understand those cultures. Admittedly, this imperative is easier to 
assert than to achieve. However, we have little choice; failure to do so can result in tac-
tical successes but strategic failures. In today‘s information age, the gap between stra-
tegic impact and tactical events can be small. We must be masters at manipulating this 
space. With appropriate understandings of foreign cultures we can assess – in advance – 
the impacts of various tactical options on our strategic intent. 
• Learn continually. The future brings with it ever tighter cycles of technological, social, 
political and economic change. To produce actionable intelligence our personnel devel-
opment system needs equally tight cycles of education and training. Our people must 
learn to exploit each set of new technologies as they arrive; and test and experiment 
with current sensors to develop new and advanced ISR capabilities. This is one of the 
main charters of our ISR Center of Excellence. Our Airmen must understand new ene-
mies as they emerge and old enemies as they evolve. These cycles of learning must be 
continuous throughout the careers of our ISR professionals. As Alvin Toffler wrote a 
quarter century ago, ―The illiterate of the 21st Century will not be those who cannot read 
and write, but those who cannot learn, unlearn and relearn.‖  
• Share knowledge. It takes a network to kill a network. We will build the world‘s finest 
network of knowledge distribution. Airmen will not just encourage the cross-
organizational sharing of information, 
we will incentivize it. We will demand 
USAF ISR professionals communicate 
across hierarchies whenever they see 
potential value. Our people must dem-
onstrate good judgment when sharing information (e.g., multi-level security), and we 
will hold them accountable for their judgment, but our risk-reward balance will favor 
sharing too much information as opposed to sharing too little. 
• Foster Multidimensional Leaders. We will reserve our leadership positions for those 
who demonstrate the ability to lead teams to create knowledge. Our mission is too big 
for any single person to master it all. We must simultaneously operate in air, space and 
cyberspace; defeat enemies across the spectrum of operations (from small terrorist 
groups to nuclear-equipped nations); use multiple methods of ISR (the ―INTs‖); partner 
with the entire Intelligence Community plus allies; manage data through collection, 
processing, analysis and dissemination; and, meet the demands of customers who range 
                                                 
8 Defense Intelligence Strategy.  
9 Quoted by Henry Eason, "New Theory Shoots Down Old War Ideas," Atlanta Constitution, March 22, 1981. 
For defense intelligence professionals, this means 
our missions will be diverse and multidimensional, 
punctuated by persistent regional engagements 
requiring a range of military, humanitarian, and 
diplomatic capabilities and assets to be used si-
multaneously. Cultural awareness, social model-
ing, and language proficiency will be as important 
as new intelligence systems and technologies. We 
will need to develop a sizeable cadre of immedi-
ately deployable experts with disparate skills. And 
as the Director of National Intelligence, Michael 
McConnell, has stated, diversity must be treated 
as a strategic mission imperative if we are to op-
erate well in this environment. 
-- James Clapper, Undersecretary of 
Defense for Intelligence, 20088 
Machines don't fight wars. Terrain doesn't fight 
wars. Humans fight wars. You must get into the 
mind of humans. That's where the battles are won. 
-- Colonel John Boyd, USAF9 
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from the cockpit to the White House. Mastery is only possible through the actions of high 
performing teams. Only teams can produce actionable knowledge by fusing multiple me-
dia, tools, perspectives, and customers – and teams require insightful leadership. Our 
most valuable people are those who successfully lead cross-domain, cross-discipline 
teams to create actionable knowledge.  
Our goal is to create knowledge that will persuade, dissuade, shape, and change the beha-
vior of our Nation‘s enemies.10 Each of these five principles is critical to achieving this goal. 
They are fundamental to the ways Airmen can seize the initiative through air, space and cy-




                                                 
10 Immediately following the May 2008 natural disasters in Burma and China, USPACOM offered humanitarian as-
sistance to include providing geospatial information to help with relief operations. 
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ORGANIZE FOR THE FUTURE 
 
As missions and technologies change, so will the structure of the intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance enterprise of the United States Air Force. Therefore, we need organiza-
tional structures that continuously adapt to the information age capabilities and objectives 
of our nation, and those of our enemies.  
Today’s leading institutions organize for continual adaptation. Especially in the in-
formation and communications sector, top corporations organize in ways that allow conti-
nuous synchronization of change across the entire operation. From central campuses, inven-
tive and responsive firms continually form and reform teams to seize opportunities and 
meet new competitors, and then rapidly synchronize new approaches and products across 
global components. With products that rarely remain leading-edge beyond five or ten years, 
the best information age firms organize to actively promote change – not just react to it. 
Air Force operations also capitalize on centralized approaches where they provide joint force 
advantages. We run an air war spanning all of Southwest Asia from a single Combined Air 
Operations Center (CAOC) in Qatar. We control all global mobility missions from the 618th 
Tanker Airlift Control Center in Illinois. We control worldwide sorties of Predators and Rea-
pers from Creech AFB, Nevada, and Global Hawks from Beale AFB in California, and then 
exploit their data at multiple locations around the globe. Centralized control allows Airmen 
to synchronize complex operations across the globe, and adjust tasking as operational sit-
uations dictate—projecting power without projecting vulnerability. Correspondingly, the Air 
Force tenet of decentralized execution allows Airmen to innovate and execute with initiative 
that only comes from empowering personnel to apply guidance at the lowest possible level.  
We are bringing this same concept to ISR resource management. As directed by the 
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, AF/A2 has the ―authority and responsibility to organ-
ize, plan and manage the Air Force National (strategic) and Service (operational) intelli-
gence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.‖11 The intent is to specify a single focal-
point to minimize seams between ISR processes and strengthen advocacy for ISR inside the 
USAF. 
To achieve integration and advocate effectively, AF/A2 will develop positions for all joint, 
service and interagency resource management decisions affecting USAF ISR.12 It will exer-
cise end-to-end leadership of USAF ISR regarding doctrine, personnel, guidance documents, 
long-range plans, program objective memoranda and supporting analyses & estimates. The 
A2 at each of our major commands should have parallel responsibilities for ISR capabilities 
within their commands.  
This single USAF ISR ―voice‖ will synchronize USAF perspectives to create an Air Force ISR 
―enterprise‖ to ensure AF ISR meets national objectives. Integration at this level will ensure 
our air, space and cyberspace ISR capabilities align internally with the rest of the USAF, and 
externally with the rest of the intelligence community and the joint team.  
AF/A2 will build the perspective, data, and vision to make informed modernization decisions, 
and then guide USAF recommendations through multiple, complex and overlapping bureauc-
racies. This single ISR focal point can rationalize programming and policy decisions from 
above (e.g., the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Director of National In-
telligence), across (e.g., USAF programming, acquisition and personnel), and below (e.g., 
                                                 
11 HQ USAF PAD 07-09, 7 May 07, Air Force Intelligence Transformation. 
12 Current examples of such bodies include the Deputy Advisory Working Group and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Re-
quirements Oversight Council. 
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all elements of USAF ISR). It can provide consistent and comprehensive guidance for the 
thousands of daily decisions that strategically affect our ISR enterprise. 
Our partners (who have increasing weight in our investment decisions) deserve a single foc-
al point to help prioritize and integrate future USAF ISR capabilities. With our dynamic tech-
nological environment, it is simply too difficult for multiple external partners to synchronize 
priorities with multiple internal decision makers. They deserve a single entry point on USAF 
ISR resource decisions—a focal point that AF/A2 provides. 
As a first principle, AF/A2 will use this organizational construct to evolve ISR as an inte-
grated whole. We will not build stovepiped ISR systems. We will not arbitrarily reserve cer-
tain ISR missions solely for space platforms and others solely for atmospheric systems. Each 
element of USAF ISR collection, processing, analysis and dissemination (CPAD) depends on 
the other elements so we will develop the 
entire process as a single entity. We will 
synchronize advances in each area (such as 
collection) as we advance all the other CPAD 
elements across our responsibilities (intelli-
gence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and 
our domains (air, space and cyberspace). We 
will pay special attention to integrating non-
traditional ISR13 (such as ELINT sensors on 
F-22) into the total architecture. Sensors on 
non-traditional ISR platforms can provide 
our ISR enterprise huge returns not attaina-
ble elsewhere. We will also work with other 
services, joint and departmental agencies to 
achieve national objectives. In tandem with our partners in the joint team and the intelli-
gence community, we will develop an integrated set of ISR capabilities, with its associated 
command and control, to ensure comprehensive coverage within fiscal guidance and pru-
dent management of risk.  
For similar reasons, AF/A2 will also act as the service focal point for specific joint and na-
tional capabilities. At the present time, specific Service Cryptologic Element (SCE) authority 
resides with the AF ISR Agency commander, but is coordinated through the AF/A2. Should 
other aspects of ISR (such as HUMINT, GEOINT and MASINT) require supporting service 
elements, AF/A2 will also assume a similar role. As the senior intelligence officer of the Air 
Force for these specific capabilities, AF/A2 can exercise its unique position to promote inter-
dependence, foster interoperability and minimize ―stovepipes.‖ AF/A2 will integrate resource 
decisions in each service ISR element with all the other ISR elements in the enterprise.  
In terms of systems, we subscribe to the concept of interdependence. We have neither the 
need nor the funds to field every possible ISR capability suitable for USAF component op-
erations. We are part of a national ISR infrastructure; we will leverage the core competen-
cies of other intelligence agencies and the rest of the joint team to perform not only air, 
space and cyberspace missions, but to also include the performance of current and future 
national missions.  
                                                 
13 Exploitation of data collected by sensors on non-ISR platforms; also called non-traditional ISR. 
14 Letters, Air Force Magazine, May 2007 
(O)ur ultimate focus must recognize that jointness isn’t a pejorative term, nor is it a notion that dimi-
nishes our Air Force… (T)he Joint Force is more sophisticated, interdependent, and capable than any 
single service, agency, or discipline. 
-- General Norton Schwartz, USAF, 200714 
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Finally, the AF/A2‘s charter to ―manage and present integrated AF ISR capabilities‖15 is an 
evolutionary step. Striking the right USAF ISR investment balance among multiple missions, 
users and technologies, plus integrating these decisions with personnel and CONOPS devel-
opment, and then presenting capabilities to combatant commanders through their air com-
ponents, are immense tasks. Our increasing ability to rapidly gather, analyze, and dissemi-
nate all-source intelligence will make ISR means, products, and personnel more valuable to 
warfighters and strategists, from senior leaders at the National level to the Airman on the 
line. As such, there may be tremendous synergy in bringing together all ISR capabilities in 
an end-to-end ISR Numbered Air Force (NAF) or ISR Major Command (MAJCOM). It's not 
just about ISR aircraft any longer—it's about the global ISR enterprise, including ties to the 
Combat Support Agencies; ISR from and in space and cyberspace; Distributed Common 
Ground System (DCGS); National Tactical Integration (NTI); HUMINT, SIGINT, MASINT, 
GEOINT; ISR Groups and NAF-C needs; SOF ISR requirements; Processing, Exploitation, 
and Dissemination (PAD); Targeting; and much more.  
ISR is currently spread out among various commands in various domains—where it is not 
often a priority—and it will never realize its potential as long as it remains disaggregated. 
Organizing AF ISR as an enterprise integrating air, space, and cyberspace ISR functions into 
a NAF or MAJCOM is a step that can actualize the construct of cross-domain dominance. 
As an evolutionary and appropriate step into the future establishing an ISR NAF, or MAJCOM 
will ensure appropriate presentation of all source, cross-domain ISR end to end capabili-
ties—the ISR platforms in air, space, and cyberspace, and the associated PAD systems and 
architectures—in a world of ever growing ISR demand. This will be a critical step as part of 
a long-term approach to building a cross-domain, cross-discipline ISR enterprise; one that is 
capable of lead turning our constantly changing security and technological environments—
not simply to report changes, but to anticipate them and then capitalize on that knowledge. 
As we centralize leadership for the USAF ISR en-
terprise, we will continue to advocate for decen-
tralized execution. We will implement centralized 
command of the overall ISR enterprise to achieve syn-
ergies in organizing, training, and equipping, while en-
trusting the decentralized execution of ISR operations 
to operational leaders to achieve timely and appropri-
ate actions. 
In our era of conflict, targets are increasingly unpre-
dictable. They emerge suddenly, strike quickly, and 
then meld into surrounding terrain. The resulting de-
mands of time compression require pushing ISR opera-
tional planning and execution down to the lowest possi-
ble levels. The necessity for tighter decision cycles than 
any enemy drives us to rely on decentralized execution. 
At each level within our decentralized chain, our people need to know the ―why‖ behind 
their tasking. With this perspective they can bring the art of war to ISR mission planning 
                                                 
15 HQ USAF PAD 07-09. 
The Air Force began its Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance transformation about two years 
ago and is blazing a trail by creating a new ISR focus by empowering personnel, establishing globa-
lized ISR organizations, and implementing a cross-domain portfolio of capabilities. Bold thoughts span 
from the possible creation of an ISR MAJCOM to a future with more unmanned than manned ISR sys-
tems.  
-- James Clapper, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, 2008 
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and execution. Our Airmen can stay ahead of innovative and dynamic enemies by adapting 
the knowledge we create to the new opportunities and threats that suddenly emerge. 
Our model is to inform generally and empower specifically. While empowering the broadest 
distribution of information, we will specify various levels of decision authority. Through mul-
ti-level access, our entire enterprise will work to discover new knowledge while still holding 
specific authorities responsible for the ultimate decisions.  
The Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (AF DCGS) is the heart of a 
global cross-domain integrated knowledge dissemination approach. AF DCGS is the 
Nation‘s premier network of ISR professionals in air, space and cyberspace operations. It 
provides an open, net-enabled information architecture, fully joined with the DCGS of the 
other services. We spiral AF DCGS development to integrate new capabilities as they dep-
loy. Our overall goal for the AF DCGS network is to integrate global sensor data of all types, 
turn them into decision-quality intelligence in near-real-time, and send this intelligence di-
rectly to those in need at the Joint Task Force level and below.  
This architecture can bring the global capabilities of USAF ISR to bear on any challenge. For 
example, with the recent change in organizing the DCGS structure as a global organization, 
the commander of any Air Force Major Command (MAJCOM) can access the entire AF DCGS 
system in a crisis. MAJCOMs are now not limited to only using those DCGS elements as-
signed to them, but can exploit the AF DCGS architecture around the world—around the 
clock as circumstances require. If need be, we can focus our entire global network of exper-
tise (including the all-source analysis strengths at the National Air and Space Intelligence 
Center) on a particular MAJCOM air component mission.  
This virtual global network has a series of operational advantages. It decreases our deploy-
ment footprint by accessing analysis and command and control functions far from the 
fight.16 The virtual global network also cuts deployment and sustainment requirements, les-
sens our exposure to casualties (an American strategic center of gravity), makes more per-
sonnel available from the first day of any crisis, allows us to task global networks of experts 
throughout an operation, and gives our people well-exercised and secure links with the rest 
of the intelligence community. These operational advantages allow us to bring overwhelm-
ing focus to any problem across the globe on a moment‘s notice. It is key to our long term 
goal of achieving persistent ISR. 
This approach parallels trends in collection platforms. More of our collection capabilities are 
being hosted on unmanned aircraft (e.g., UAS, aerostats). Processed data from these plat-
forms must move on global networks to multiple analysis sites for exploitation and further 
dissemination. So when we task one element of this architecture (such as a UAS), we must 
concurrently assign responsibility for the subsequent analysis within our global network of 
Distributed Ground Stations. We must also identify the distribution links (such as specific 
satellite transponders). Each of these assignments is necessary to turn collected data into 
actionable intelligence. Our global AF DCGS architecture allows us to designate each link in 
the ISR chain (sensors, platforms, paths, and analysis) to the highest priority tasks at hand.  
                                                 
16 Personnel and equipment needed to launch, recover and maintain platforms will deploy wherever needed. 
17 www.pacaf.af.mil/library/pacafheritage/jimmydoolittle/doolittle/index.asp. 
If we have to fight, prepare to do so from the neck up instead of from the neck down. 
-- General Jimmy Doolittle, USAFR17 
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At the same time, we recognize the face-to-face imperatives of our craft. We will deploy 
elements of AF DCGS forward to interface directly with operational decision makers. Whe-
rever key decisions are made, we will position a cadre of leaders to personally advise and 
direct ISR operations. These leaders will have instant access to our global ISR enterprise.  
We have neither the money nor the time to put an eardrum and eyeball on everything 24/7. 
Therefore, we will use centralized control of our global capabilities to optimize and rapidly 
present tailored USAF ISR forces whenever and wherever needed. We will then use decen-
tralized execution to focus USAF ISR capabilities on targets that at particular points in time 
have the highest operational priorities across all service, joint, and national requirements. 
Only through an optimization approach that capitalizes on service interdependency, can the 
nation more effectively achieve persistent ISR capabilities and increase our ability to pene-
trate sanctuaries created by our enemies. 
AF ISR, enhanced by the recently established 
AF ISR Center of Excellence, AF Analysis Center 
of Excellence, and AF Targeting Center of Ex-
cellence will produce tactics, techniques, and 
procedures that will not only keep pace with 
the rest of the operational and intelligence 
communities, but will also prepare us to lead 
operational offensives. We will operate as ei-
ther supporting or supported elements of na-
tional power, depending on the security situa-
tion. 
The Air Force joint ISR vision is an implementation of the DoD‘s net-centric information 
sharing vision in which all ISR assets—space, cyber, air-breathing, and even those organic 
to small units—could be managed as a single constellation. Tasking would be posted to the 
network and be persistently available and accessed by sensing platforms according to pro-
cedures that are adjusted as circumstances require. Sensed products would be instantly ex-
posed to authorized users who would have the ability to select raw or processed products, 
or both. Applying this holistic view of the battlespace to those with the imagination and in-
itiative to capitalize on it will provide agility and produce capabilities as yet unthought-of 
much more quickly and at less cost than the industrial age perspectives of the past.  
As a necessary step toward accomplishing this vision, and to ensure ISR effects are syn-
chronized with other kinetic and non kinetic operations, we will move forward to integrate 
collection management processes with the tasking of all other assets inside joint and com-
bined air operation centers (AOCs). ISR tasking processes have been treated as a staff func-
tion under the direction of theater J2s vice being employed by a designated component 
commander as a part of operational execution. As we have advanced platforms to conduct 
mutli-role missions with longer sortie duration times, the distinction between ISR and any 
other air, space and cyber mission can no longer be separated by sortie exclusivity, but ra-
ther must address the phases of a sortie paired with specific missions. We must continually 
evolve all aspects of air, space and cyber power and advance our AOC command and con-
trol/tasking processes to keep pace with the flexibility, agility and employment these op-
tions bring us. As we move into a world where every sensor is a shooter, and every shooter 
is a sensor, we must adjust our planning, tasking, and command and control processes ac-
cordingly. 
                                                 
18 Remarks to a Defense Strategy Seminar, 27 April 2007. 
I would tell you that in the 21st Century intel-
ligence is operations. By way of example, 
when we took out Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 
Iraq last June, that operation consisted of 
countless analyst hours, over 600 hours of 
Predator time, followed by about 10 minutes 
of F-16 time. The find, fix, track and target 
part of the equation in this case took far 
longer, and was much more complex than the 
engage part. 
-- Lt General David Deptula, USAF, 200718 
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EQUIP FOR THE FUTURE 
 
Over the next two decades, the United States Air Force will 
dramatically reshape our entire ISR force. We will procure 
new technologies, retire aging systems, modernize current 
platforms, and integrate future joint and national capabilities. 
We will make far-reaching capability and equipment decisions 
that reflect today‘s perceptions of the future security environ-
ment, to include developments in technology, threat and fiscal 
guidance.  
Future Airmen will have to live with our decisions. The USAF 
ISR enterprise we build today will be the one our successors 
employ tomorrow. We owe future Airmen a total portfolio of 
ISR capabilities that will meet whatever security challenge 
they face. 
We do not have the option of building multiple future portfolios. We cannot build one ISR 
force for future wars with peer competitors and a different ISR force for future wars with in-
surgents. We cannot build three separate sets of ISR capabilities for operations in air, space 
and cyberspace. All our systems must work together to give national, joint and component 
commanders decisive effects regardless of the type of conflict. Our decisions to retire, sus-
tain, or modernize individual systems must produce a single and integrated portfolio of ca-
pabilities, ready to achieve future decision superiority in any conflict across air, space and 
cyberspace.  
A guiding principle as we look to equip our AF for the future is that every sensor platform 
will be a shooter and every shooter platform will be a sensor. Our goal is that what today 
we label ―non-traditional ISR‖ will become simply ―ISR‖ In the future.  
Measuring the value of future systems in future operations is both art and science. 
We have no data on the future, so we cannot assign exact values to future systems across 
all future operations. However, we can project the relative values of alternative future sys-
tems within a total portfolio of capabilities. Because all must contribute in the emerging 
knowledge-based environment, we can project value relative to each other by comparing 
how each exploits the ―deep fundamentals‖ of the time, space, matter, and knowledge in 
the information age. These deep fundamentals affect all human activities, from the way 
humankind cooperates and innovates to the way we make war.  
 Time. The temporal domain of the battlespace. While speed in battle has increased 
throughout history, modern conflict has accelerated combat to the speed of light. We 
must develop operational concepts that exploit the potential of speed-of-light weapons 
(such as directed energy, electronic warfare and cyber) plus integrate them with the 
proven performance of less-than-speed-of-light weapons (such as missiles and tradition-
al surface forces). Through new man-machine relationships, we must integrate our air, 
space and cyberspace ISR systems to produce actionable knowledge for joint command-
ers faster than any enemy. 
 Space. The distance between objects in the operational area. Boundaries in 21st Century 
warfare are increasingly arbitrary and decreasingly relevant. Commanders must consider 
previously unimaginable distances that extend tactical events globally (such as control-
ling UAS over Afghanistan remotely from Nevada). Cyberspace further blurs boundaries 
between regional conflicts and the homeland, while satellites totally ignore regional and 
other spatial lines between combatant commanders. 
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 Matter. The amount or volume of resources required to produce a specific effect. Indi-
viduals and small groups can now exert strategic effects that were once reserved for 
large nation-states. On the battlefield, effects that once required massed formations of 
soldiers and fleets of bombers are now achieved by a few precision weapons. The emer-
gence of cyberwar illustrates how the amount of matter needed to produce significant 
effects is now measured at the particle level. 
 Knowledge. The awareness of what is operationally relevant in the conflict space. No 
military organization can survive for long in the face of enemy knowledge superiority. 
When the information age makes unprecedented quantities of data available to practical-
ly any group, knowledge superiority depends on qualitative differentials: identifying the 
specific target and directing the right matter to the right space at the right time within 
the opponent‘s observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop.  
By appreciating the key components of these fundamentals, we position ourselves for long-
term success. Therefore, we will assess the relative values of individual technologies and 
systems, and alternative portfolios of technologies and systems, in terms of criteria that 
map to these fundamentals. 
Fundamental Component Definition 
Time 
Time-to-Think 
Amount of time a decision maker has for “orienting” in the OODA loop. 
As the complexity of conflict increases, decision makers need more time 
to absorb the immense amounts of information available. ISR systems 
that provide decision makers with added decision time have high value.  
Adaptability 
Speed and ease that an ISR system can adjust to new conditions and 
requirements. We need ISR systems with the ability to quickly adapt to 
unforeseen operations. As the predictability of new threats diminish, so 
too does the value of ―one-of-a-kind‖ ISR systems.  
Time-on-Station 
Amount of time an ISR system can collect (observe) on an area of inter-
est. Long dwell times over target increase the opportunity for persistent 
surveillance, allow for change detection against low-signature targets 
and decrease the number of platforms required. 
Responsiveness 
Time to target area. In our unpredictable world, the faster an ISR sys-
tem can deploy to a target area, the better. Satellites with continuous 
dwell over specific areas have great value; however, the expense of ad-




Utility of a mix of ISR systems to specific operations (i.e., humanitarian 
response, major theater war, irregular warfare, cyber war). Because 
multiple types of operations regularly occur in the same space, ISR sys-
tems applicable across the full spectrum of operations have high value.  
Coverage 
Total area surveilled at any specific time. Systems that can collect over 
large areas (of land, spectrum, etc.) are more valuable than systems 
that can only view small areas. 
Discrimination 
Accurately discern legitimate targets among many similar objects, espe-
cially mobile targets. Systems with the capability to distinguish hostile 
targets from innocent civilians – for example in urban terrain, and in 
less than ideal conditions (e.g. night, precipitation, decoys, cloud cover, 
blowing sand) are increasingly valuable. 
Accuracy 
Precisely geo-locate a target or object of interest. The ability of muni-
tions to provide tailored effects and precise damage, plus the advantage 
in exposing fewer strikers to combat, heightens the value of ISR sys-
tems that provide the accurate geo-location of targets. 
Survivability 
Cover any area of interest without suffering loss of collection, 
processing, analysis or dissemination capabilities. ISR systems that per-
form in high threat environments with low risk of disruption have higher 
value. 
Penetration 
Able to sense the enemy even when the enemy takes action to prevent 
our access. For example, the use of stealth technology to access an op-
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posed environment without the enemy‘s awareness of our presence. 
Fundamental Component Definition 
Matter 
Sustainment 
Degree of support required (e.g., personnel, training, maintenance and 
resupply) over time. The more autonomy a system allows, the greater 
value it has for operational commanders. 
Replacement 
Ease of fielding additional or replacement ISR capabilities. Systems we 
can quickly field (to offset attrition or meet unexpected threats) have 
higher value than systems (such as satellites) that require years to de-
velop and check-out. Logistics and training tails needed to realize oper-
ational capability are added factors. 
Surge 
Deploy and support additional systems within operationally-significant 
timelines. Against innovative enemies, commanders may need unex-
pected levels of additional force. Systems able to rapidly add force 
structure in time to meet commanders‘ needs (e.g., they have a robust 




Number and types of different “INTs” a system can employ. Few targets 
reveal their secrets via a single phenomenology. The ability to employ 
multiple phenomena simultaneously can produce insights unobtainable 
through single sensors. 
Interoperability 
Degree of sharing across different types of sensors and information sys-
tems. Systems optimize for rapid and wide information distribution 
(e.g., Distributed Common Ground System) have high value due to im-
proved information fusion across multiple collection methods. 
Uniqueness 
Whether a system is the only means to collect against an area of inter-
est under certain conditions. When the phenomenology related to an 
object/target is so specialized that only single system is capable of pro-
viding that information. 
Correlation 
How well disparate data can be synthesized to provide understanding 
which creates knowledge. The entire system, human and machine, 
needs the ability to combine seemingly unrelated data to create under-
standing. Superior training in the art of intelligence can greatly increase 
the ability to synthesize data and find meaning. 
 
As an information-based enterprise, USAF ISR will use these seventeen compo-
nents to guide investment priorities. Taken as a whole, they capture the future value of 
individual systems and portfolios of systems across the four fundamentals in the information 
age. Using a set of values that reflect our best understanding of the future, we can weigh 
the unique strengths and weaknesses of each ISR system (or portfolio of systems) that we 
decide to procure, modernize, replace or divest directly against its alternatives. By using 
these seventeen criteria as a guide to investment decision alternatives, we can capture their 
future value in a way that allows direct comparisons while considering risk. Risk includes the 
potential loss of lives, time or investment and needs to be weighed carefully against each 
investment decision.  
These measures of future value can be applied to our investment decisions in three general 
ways: 
 Compare portfolios of systems as a whole. Against complex, lethal and innovative 
enemies, each of our ISR systems must work with other systems to achieve a joint force 
commander‘s desired effects. By assigning values to each system‘s contributions to 
these seventeen components, we can better assess the future value of entire portfolios 
relative to alternative portfolios. Also, we may be able to assess the value of changing a 
single system within a portfolio by how much it changes the future value of the portfolio 
as a whole. 
 Compare individual systems. We can compare scores of similar systems to assess 
value relative to each other. For example, while the U-2 and Global Hawk perform simi-
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lar missions, they (and their supporting elements) have distinct strengths and weak-
nesses vis-à-vis each other. These measures of future value are another option to eva-
luate those differences.  
 Embrace interdependence. This future value assessment enables examination and 
analysis of USAF ISR systems in the context of the Nation‘s total ISR enterprise. We rec-
ognize that fiscal realities and partner competencies argue for an interdependent ap-
proach to USAF ISR investment decisions. This construct gives us a means to weigh the 
future value of alternative interdependent portfolios. 
This strategic portfolio model can guide investment decisions, but it can’t make 
them. Decision makers will still need to add assessments of affordability, and of various 
other forms of risk to our measures of future value.  
Every investment decision also includes tough calls on future risk. Decision makers must 
balance budget risk (will the contractor deliver within budget?), schedule risk (will the con-
tractor deliver on time?), political risk (will the program produce allies or antibodies in the 
administration and Congress?), technical risk (will the program perform as advertised?), 
competitor risk (will an adversary quickly field a countermeasure), bureaucratic risk (will 
‖institutional inertia‖ frustrate development), and transition risk (can we tolerate a gap be-
tween a new system and its predecessor?).  
Assessments over uncertain budget projections and multiple forms of risk are judgment 
calls that like many others are outside our control. However, we can and will give decision 
makers our best military advice on the future value of alternative systems and portfolios. By 
understanding how individual systems contribute across the fundamentals of the informa-
tion age (time, space, matter and knowledge), we can compare alternative systems in 
terms relevant to multiple future environments. We can also assess their overall contribu-
tions within portfolios of systems, to include interdependent systems across the intelligence 
community. Decision makers can then insert their estimates of risk and affordability to pro-
duce the ultimate verdict.  
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Our strategic portfolio model, incorporating our assessments of future budgets 
and levels of acceptable risks, produces the following recommended USAF ISR 
portfolio guidance. 








Resolution (Tier I) 
Space Systems 
 
Continue to leverage investments in national architecture, 
while advocating movement to a unified National space 
acquisition organization. Focus investments on integrating 
National data into AF DCGS. Continue to support with AF 
manpower at current levels. Leverage commercial capabil-
ities for augmentation. Leverage investments in national 
and commercial systems and focus Service investments 
on Tier II systems.  
Medium Resolu-
tion (Tier II) 
Space Systems 
 
Pursue a new paradigm for future satellite capability in-
vestment: small satellites, less expensive, larger quanti-
ties (compared to Tier I systems), and medium resolution. 
Seek capabilities that are more responsive to COCOM 
tasking and requirements and follow the Operationally 
Responsive Space (ORS) concept of launching replace-




Raise overall reliance on space systems to provide persis-
tent surveillance over permissive and denied airspace and 
areas of interest. All space capabilities to include ISR, 
SSA, Weather, and Integrated threat Warning will provide 
ISR data to net-centric, Service Oriented Architectures 




High Altitude – 
Manned Systems  
Reduce reliance on manned, high-altitude ISR aircraft sys-
tems. Leverage non-traditional ISR capabilities of stealthy 
high-altitude manned aircraft (e.g., F-22, F-35, next gen-
eration bomber), and adapt current planning and tasking 
processes (e.g., Air Tasking Order) to accommodate ISR 





Continue increasing investment trend in R&D and technol-
ogy development for long-endurance / ultra long-
endurance, multi-mission capable ISR and non-traditional 






Continue investments in manned ISR and non-traditional 
ISR aircraft as a bridge to the recapitalization of the air-
craft with ISR/secondary ISR UAS. Increase development 
of non-traditional ISR capabilities for manned fighter and 
all mobility aircraft. 
Local Unmanned 
Systems  
Increase investments in long endurance / ultra long-
endurance, multi-mission capable ISR and secondary ISR 




This is primarily a surface service, small unit focused in-
vestment area. Leverage interdependencies of sister ser-
vices to insure that small units receive the ISR they need 




Future overall ISR air capabilities will migrate towards 
greater numbers and capabilities in unmanned air sys-
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tems (using reachback) than in manned systems. All ISR 
aircraft and non-traditional ISR aircraft systems must be 
capable of providing ISR data to net-centric, Service 
Oriented Architectures19 (Joint and National) in near-real-
time. UAS will provide greater persistence and reduce 
risks to crews, especially in non-permissive airspace. Use 
of stealthy, non-traditional ISR aircraft will increase the 
overall collection capability and coverage without addi-
tional ISR force structure. Integrated self-healing net-
works of airborne ISR systems have the potential to offer 








Increase investment trend in offensive and defensive net-
work capabilities. Leverage commercial R&D and capabili-
ties.  
Software  
Increase investment trend in R&D and capabilities to pro-
vide data to net-centric, Service Oriented Architectures 
(Joint and National) in near-real-time.  
Connectivity  
Increase investment trend in R&D and capabilities to pro-
vide data to net-centric, Service Oriented Architectures 




Increase the investment trend in R&D and capabilities that 
support full spectrum operations and provide multi-
purpose users access to data in near-real-time. This will 
increase overall persistence, capability and capacity of the 
ISR enterprise and potentially reduce the reliance on 









Ground Systems  
Maintain investment in unattended ground sensors with 
emphasis on CBRNE and WMD characterization/attribu-
tion, particularly for domestic events.  
Manned Ground 
Systems  
Increase investment in ground human collectors 
(HUMINT) and capability to provide data to net-centric, 




Increase investment in R&D and capabilities to provide 
data among net-centric, Service Oriented Architectures 
(Joint and National) in near-real-time and integrate tradi-





Increase investment and R&D to achieve capability to 
provide data to net-centric, Service Oriented Architectures 
(Joint and National) in near-real-time. This will allow mul-
tiple user access to ISR data in near-real-time for all 
source analysis and knowledge dominance. This will in-
crease overall persistence, capability, and capacity and 
potentially allow reductions in other collection areas.  
                                                 
19 An integrated architecture of ISR sensors, processing, analysis and dissemination. 
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Refocus investment in human capital to include develop-
ment of military and civilian work forces of the future. 
Provide analysts additional training to increase cultural 
and cognitive situational awareness analytic skills. 
Education  
Increase investments and R&D in technologically intensive 
educational tools. Refocus and revitalize skills education 
throughout a career to enhance cognitive situational 
awareness expertise and improve overall analytical speed 
and quality.  
Analysis  
Increase investments in technologically intensive tools to 
aid humans to affect orders of magnitude increases in ef-
ficiencies in processing (to include machine-to-machine 
processing), analysis development, and exploitation of in-
creasing volumes of ISR data. Increase investments in 
tools for language translators, change detection alerts, 







Increase investments in career-wide education and train-
ing. By improving workforce analysis skills, quality, ad-
vanced tools, education and training, the overall work-
force numbers may be optimized and potentially reduced 
in the long term. This will allow more effective analysis of 
increasing amount of ISR data and greater flexibility to 
respond to changes in the global environment/nature of 
warfare. 
 
The overall theme of our recommended ISR portfolio guidance is twofold: evolve to 
a force of more unmanned capabilities than manned capabilities; and, build a Service 
Oriented Architecture (SOA) where cross-domain knowledge enables decision superiority 
across the spectrum of operations. To increase the value of human decision-making, this 
portfolio continues to shift human location from sensor platforms to the global architecture. 
This portfolio mitigates risk through diversification. It moves away from the notion of dis-
crete operations in individual domains and focuses on achieving desired effects to create 
Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power. It retains the advantages of both manned 
and unmanned systems, exploits multiple domains (air, space and cyberspace), leverages 
the capabilities of national and joint partners, and integrates nontraditional ISR systems. 
This portfolio is relevant to the full spectrum of present and future conflict, regardless of lo-
cation, duration or intensity.  
Most importantly, this recommended USAF ISR portfolio positions future Airmen to lead turn 
adversary capabilities. It reflects our best judgment on the technologies, threats and fiscal 
guidance of the future security environment. By reflecting the deep fundamentals of the in-
formation age, we believe this portfolio gives future Airmen the tools to dominate whatever 
security challenges they face. More analysis and discussion will be required to develop these 
recommendations, and more needs to be done to improve the acquisition system to adapt 
faster to meet the changing security environment. This is a start.  
                                                 
20 Prepared testimony as VCSAF to the HASC/Readiness Subcommittee, 13 March 2007. 
Because ISR capabilities are at the core of finding, fixing and engaging targets, ISR has never been 
more important during our 60 years as an independent Service. In fact, ISR has become the founda-
tion of Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power. Yet ISR assets and Airmen are often “low density” com-
pared to their high demand. We are wearing them out at rates that must be reversed. 
-- General John Corley, USAF, 200720 
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The end game for the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities of the Unit-
ed States Air Force is to achieve Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power through 
cross domain integration of ISR in air, space and cyberspace. Our goal is to build a total 
system that combines persistent surveillance with a decision system that creates and ex-
ploits knowledge faster than any enemy can react. This total system is ambitious yet attain-
able. It is up to our generation of Airmen to lay its foundations so that future generations 
will have the tools to dominate 21st Century adversaries. The Department of Defense is 
ready to turn the corner on ISR. The strategy outlined in this document sets the course for 
the US Air Force‘s part in lead turning the changes required to accomplish this goal. 
 
 
